Despite some missile defense advocates’ claims that 24 satellites could form the basis of a boost-phase space-based missile interceptor (SBI) system, many physicists do not agree. A better question is how could a satellite constellation of this size best contribute to U.S. missile defense?
As it stands, the planned strategy of forsaking arms control in the name of coercive diplomacy is bound to backfire. The Pentagon should tread carefully, lest it invites Russia to develop strategic weapons it has no method or intention of countering.
The deployment of a space-based missile intercept layer would require launching hundreds or thousands of weapons into space – an expensive, inefficient, and provocative proposition.
The idea of space-based missile interceptors is not new nor prohibited, but it is a bad idea. This piece looks beyond the policy arguments and explores the inefficiencies and vulnerabilities of space-based missiles.
In this episode of The CSIS Podcast, Todd Harrison and Tom Karako discuss the future of U.S. missile defense after North Korea tested its longest-range missile yet, the Hwasong-15.
Adversary missile forces represent one of the most pressing threats to the power projection capabilities of the U.S. military. Ballistic, cruise, and air defense missile systems can be used to hold U.S. bases and platforms at risk and deny the U.S. military access to and freedom of action within contested areas.
In early August, North Korea threatened to launch four ballistic missiles towards Guam, targeting waters less than 30 kilometers off the island’s coast. How and when would U.S. missile defense forces respond if an attack like this were to take place? Narrated by Todd Harrison and Tom Karako. Written and produced by Thomas G. Roberts and […]