Despite some missile defense advocates’ claims that 24 satellites could form the basis of a boost-phase space-based missile interceptor (SBI) system, many physicists do not agree. A better question is how could a satellite constellation of this size best contribute to U.S. missile defense?
Author: Thomas G. Roberts
Thomas G. Roberts is a program manager and research associate at the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. His research interests include satellite system architecture analysis, civil and commercial space operations, and international collaboration in science research. Mr. Roberts is the host and executive producer of Moonstruck, a podcast about the history of human spaceflight. @ThomasGzRoberts
Beyond the Glass Ceiling: Why NASA Must Continue to Launch a Diverse Astronaut Corps
If an American astronaut wants to go to outer space, they have to go through Russia to get there. And so far, an African American has never been launched on a Russian rocket. Last month’s launch was supposed to change that.
Why a Space-Based Missile Interceptor System Is Not Viable
The deployment of a space-based missile intercept layer would require launching hundreds or thousands of weapons into space – an expensive, inefficient, and provocative proposition.
Podcast: A Behind the Scenes Look at Space Threats
Go behind the scenes with the authors of “Space Threat Assessment 2018.” They’re joined by the Secure World Foundation’s Victoria Samson and Brian Weeden to discuss what it’s like to study counterspace weapons—an inherently classified topic—in an unclassified environment.
Space Threat 2018: China Assessment
Arguably the fastest rising power in space, China has made rapid progress in developing both its space and counterspace capabilities. The country has tested direct-ascent ASAT weapons, on-orbit robotics, and remote proximity operations. Reports indicate that China is also developing and testing directed-energy and jamming technologies.
Space Threat 2018: Russia Assessment
Russia’s space and counterspace capabilities suffered after the fall of the Soviet Union, but it has since made significant progress rebuilding both programs.
Space Threat 2018: North Korea Assessment
While North Korea’s space and counterspace capabilities are limited, it has made substantial progress developing its missile, jamming, and cyber capabilities. North Korea’s missile technology clearly aligns with its strive to become a nuclear power; its jamming and cyberattack capabilities tend to be more accessible and lower-tech than some counterspace weapons.
Space Threat 2018: Iran Assessment
Iran’s pursuit of space and counterspace capabilities is a more recent development and is tied in many ways to its ballistic missile programs. However, Iran has previously used advanced jamming against commercial satellites and are reportedly further developing their cyber capabilities, as well.
Space Threat 2018: Other Actors Assessment
Other actors, including allies, adversaries, and non-state, are developing or using counterspace weapons.
Space Threat 2018: Conclusion
Space Threat Assessment 2018 evaluates open-source information on counterspace activities of adversaries, allies, and non-state actors. Counterspace weapon development from some adversaries is of serious concern and require immediate attention from policymakers.