Is There a Path to Counter Russia’s Space Weapons?

Why would Russia, the first nation to put a satellite and human into orbit, want to develop space weapons that could make parts of space unusable for up to a year? At first glance, it may be difficult to decipher Russian motivations. In 1939, British prime minister Winston Churchill famously observed that Russian decisionmaking was “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma . . .”

Understanding Russia’s desire to develop indiscriminate counterspace weapons, including a nuclear anti-satellite capability, means recognizing that one of Russian president Vladimir Putin’s top goals has always been to weaken the stature and influence of the United States. Because the United States maintains unrivaled advantages and prestige in space, while conversely Russian space equities have declined, there is no better domain in which Russia can erode U.S. standing.

Given the imbalance in how each nation views space, there are few options that might prevent Russia from seeking ever more destructive counterspace weapons. Could Russia be pressured to change course? If so, to what kind of pressure would Russia respond? Pulling levers that affect the Russian economy might get Putin’s attention.

But the United States has little economic leverage left, as Russia is mostly economically isolated from the West. On the other hand, China and India have significantly increased their trade ties with Russia. They have unique leverage that could be used to convince Russia to drop its pursuit of indiscriminate space weapons. The trick might be getting Beijing and New Delhi on board with that plan.

Counterspace Threat Landscape

There are many weapons—often called counterspace weapons—that can disable, destroy, or disrupt use of space capability. Some of those weapons, like those that facilitate the jamming and spoofing of satellite signals, have temporary effects. Other capabilities, like directed-energy systems, can permanently damage key components of satellites. Some anti-satellite weapons can produce indiscriminate effects through the creation of space debris or radiation, destroying the target satellite as well as hundreds, if not thousands, of other satellites as collateral damage.

Russia either already fields or is developing many different types of counterspace weapons. Just last month at the UN Security Council, the United States accused Russia of launching a satellite carrying a weapon that could attack other satellites. Experts speculate that this satellite was only the latest in a series of similar, if not identical, satellites launched by Russia over the last five years that may carry some type of kinetic projectile weapon. When launched at another satellite, such a weapon could generate thousands of debris fragments, threatening other spacecraft in the affected orbits and potentially creating a cascading debris-generating event.

In addition to these kinetic space weapons, Russia is allegedly developing a nuclear space-based anti-satellite weapon that would probably be capable of disabling hundreds of satellites through radiation effects or the resulting electromagnetic pulse. This new threat has been the focus of attention since revelations of this development surfaced in February 2024.

Russian Motivators

Russian equities in space are a mere shadow of what they once were during Soviet times. Consider that the United States launched 2,221 satellites last year, while Russia launched only 60. Look back 40 years to 1984, when the Soviet Union launched 122 satellites and the United States only 36. Today, China has far surpassed Russia as the second most prominent spacefaring nation behind the United States. India is motivated to succeed in space, landing a probe on the Moon last year and pursuing ambitious crewed missions to Earth orbit, and will likely soon overtake Russia as the world’s third most important space power.

Moscow’s economic gains from space have significantly decreased since its invasion of Ukraine, which produced sanctions squashing most of its international space launch business. Also, the United States no longer pays Russia to transport astronauts to the International Space Station. Today, hardly anyone is buying Russian-made rocket engines. However, circumstances have opened a door for other space partnerships. Moscow has built and launched a satellite for Iran. Russia is probably helping North Korea build better rockets. But business with Iran and North Korea—bartering space technology for munitions and drones—does not monetarily compensate for the lost business with Western launch customers.

Russian space capabilities do not play a significant role on the battlefield. Russia’s version of GPS, called GLONASS, is extremely unreliable. Almost all of the GLONASS satellites are past their service lives and starting to fail. To supplement insufficient Russian satellite communications capabilities, Russian troops allegedly use illicitly procured Starlink terminals in Ukraine.

On the other hand, the success of U.S. military operations presumes the availability of space. The United States has used satellite communications since the Vietnam War. A disruption to GPS satellites would force U.S. troops to navigate by a compass and map, the same method used by their great-grandfathers when they swept across the beaches of Normandy to liberate Europe in 1944 and 1945. Civilian and commercial infrastructure in the United States also depends on space.

Today, Russia has little to lose from a disruption to space access, whereas the United States has everything to lose. Moscow is using its aerospace engineering expertise, derived from Soviet-era achievements, to develop counterspace strike capability that can harm vital U.S. space interests. Look to submarine warfare in both world wars to find a historical parallel. Germany conducted unrestrained submarine attacks on shipping with little fear of the consequences—because Germany had virtually no maritime trade during both wars and could strike at adversaries’ vital trade interests without fear of hurting its own.

Responding to the Threat

Since February 2024, the United States has tried to convince the world that Russia is developing a nuclear anti-satellite capability. As part of those efforts, the United States and Japan introduced a UN Security Council resolution last month reaffirming the Outer Space Treaty’s ban on nuclear weapons stationed in space, which Russia vetoed. Though Russia’s vote gave the United States an opportunity to publicly reiterate concerns about Russian nuclear counterspace developments, there is no indication that it did anything to stop or slow Russian work on this nuclear capability.

Instead, Russia used the diplomatic spotlight to peddle an agreement, raised in the past by Russia and China, that calls for broad international prohibitions on counterspace weapons. As it has done when Russia and China raised this new agreement in the past, the United States opposed its approval at the United Nations. This game of one-upmanship on space arms control played over the last 20 years by the United States and Russia, as well as China to a lesser degree, has not produced any breakthroughs to improve the safety or security of space.

The fact remains that despite Russian rhetoric at the United Nations, the main issue preventing space arms controls is Russia. Putin will not place limits on his ability to strike out at U.S. space equities due to diplomatic pressure alone. If the United States declassified and publicly shared all information on the Russian counterspace threat, it is not clear how that action would produce different results. Such an approach presumes international public opinion impacts Russian decisionmaking.

But during Putin’s 25-year reign—almost 10 years longer than the longest-serving Soviet leader and twice as long as Stalin—there have been few signs that diplomatic condemnation has influenced Russian behaviors. Russia’s invasion of Georgia, annexation of Crimea and subsequent invasion of Ukraine, recent efforts to sabotage infrastructure and interfere with GPS signals in Europe, and the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko and Sergei Skripal are only the most prominent examples that prove Putin does not care about international opinion.

Finding Real Leverage

Even with Western sanctions, the Russian economy managed to grow over the last year. In fact, the International Monetary Fund expects the Russian economy to grow faster over the next year than any other advanced economy. To a large degree, credit for this achievement goes to China and India. Trade between China and Russia hit a record high in 2023, increasing over 26 percent since the year prior. China gets more oil from Russia than from any other country. India is also buying a lot of Russian oil. Indian trade with Russia has markedly increased since 2022, with no signs of slowing down.

Though there has been little sign that Beijing would exert economic pressure to change Russian behavior in Ukraine, China may feel differently about space. China has admittedly sent mixed signals. It abstained from the U.S.-Japan resolution reaffirming the nuclear space weapons ban but supported Russia’s stricter proposal. However, these actions could be interpreted within the larger geopolitical dynamics of U.S.-China relations, with China uninterested in giving the United States a symbolic diplomatic win at the United Nations when it sees no benefit in return.

Up front, it’s worth being realistic about what China would and would probably not agree to do. No matter what China thinks of the Russian counterspace threat to Chinese space assets, China will want to maintain its own counterspace arsenal, no doubt like the United States. But the issue at hand is the Russian threat, both because Russia is developing and deploying indiscriminate counterspace weapons and because Russia would hesitate far less to use such weapons because it has so much less at risk in space.

Militarily and economically, China is probably as dependent on space capabilities as the United States. And China’s investments, equities, and ambitions in space continue to grow, with China’s achievements in space a source of national pride and focus of President Xi Jinping’s attention. China already has its own GPS-like constellation, called BeiDou, and has plans to launch three Starlink-equivalent broadband constellations. China’s military operates hundreds of ISR satellites in multiple orbits. Space is integrated into China’s Digital Silk Road initiative, strengthening relationships in Africa and the Global South.

As a rising space power, India also has much to lose if Russia wrecks low Earth orbit. India is methodically ticking off space milestones, such as last year’s Chandrayaan-3 lunar mission and India’s own version of GPS, called NavIC. India is also advancing plans for future commercial and civilian endeavors in space, aiming to launch Indian astronauts into orbit as soon as 2025 and reorienting India’s space economy to compete for global space launch customers. Since India’s 2019 testing of an anti-satellite missile, which may have been more linked to domestic political considerations around upcoming elections than to any military objectives, India has mostly been silent on counterspace weapons.

A Possible Way Forward

Arguably, an international agreement that bans all nations from possessing counterspace weapons would be the best way to preserve the safety and security of space. However, this outcome is not realistic, even with the assumption that there would be a satisfactory way to define counterspace weapons, which has proven elusive to date. Looking back on history, military interests have influenced every place and domain in which humans have settled since time immemorial. There is no reason to think space is any different.

But the immediate concern is not the militarization of space per se. The issue is that a nation with precipitously declining reasons to care about space is developing and fielding counterspace weapons. Russia is the immediate threat.

At least since February, the United States has acted with some urgency to address the Russian nuclear space threat. A U.S. official said there have been discussions about Russia’s development of a nuclear anti-satellite weapon with China and India, with no further information on the timing or nature of those discussions. If U.S. actions at the United Nations are any indication, the crux of the U.S. position is that Russia cannot be permitted to station a nuclear weapon in space. While this is certainly an important objective, it misses the broader threat that Russian indiscriminate counterspace weapons, including nonnuclear debris-generating weapons, pose to space.

Whatever the nature of those discussions, there is no sign that either China or India have been convinced to help. But these are the right two countries to be talking to. China and Russia have the economic leverage to impact Russian national interests. They could require Russia to abandon certain indiscriminate counterspace capabilities or suffer the economic consequences when China and India buy less Russian oil and China stops selling Russia advanced technologies.

What more could be done to convince and incentivize China and India to apply their economic leverage? For one, looking past the nuclear issue allows an emphasis on Russian motivations in space and the genuine threat Russia poses to space safety and security. The broader picture helps highlight mutual interests and a common cause shared by the United States, China, and India. But admittedly, convincing alone might not be enough.

The United States has options to incentivize cooperation. The United States could link reducing select tariffs on Chinese imports to Chinese agreement to buy less Russian oil and sell Russia fewer advanced microelectronics. China is also looking for support from nuclear nations for its call to start negotiations on a nuclear “no-first-use” treaty. A willingness by the United States to consider and discuss this matter with China might create another route to obtain Beijing’s support on the Russian space threat.

Additionally, the United States should recognize that the Wolf Amendment does not advance U.S. interests but has stifled opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation. Had the United States taken a similar path during the Cold War, there would have been no Apollo-Soyuz mission and, probably later, no International Space Station. The barriers erected by the Wolf Amendment, reinforced by over 10 years of U.S. reticence to collaborate with China on civil space issues, now make it that much more difficult to work together on what should be a common goal: stopping the Russian threat to space.

To incentivize New Delhi, the United States could link Indian support for pressuring Russia to give up indiscriminate space weapons with the initiation of discussions with India on a free trade agreement, potentially like the Indian and Australian one signed last year. Agreeing to Indian requests to buy more U.S.-made military weapons and systems in return for Indian agreement to turn the economic screws on Russia might also produce a solution. As a bonus, a deal to sell India more U.S.-made weapons would also help wean India off Russian military hardware.

Ultimately, there is no silver bullet to protect against a Russia bent on causing disruption and destruction in space. Putin could sacrifice Russian space interests, and that sacrifice would be hardly noticed by a Russian warfighter or average citizen. Russia will not bow to diplomatic pressure and will only respond when Russian national interests are affected. To complete his thoughts from 1939, Churchill said that he “. . . cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. But perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.” Trade, business, and money impact Russian interests—but the West does not have much leverage anymore. Beijing and New Delhi hold the key.

Clayton Swope is the deputy director of the Aerospace Security Project and a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Makena Young is a fellow with the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).