The Bresident

## TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 1

NSC 6021

December 14, 1960

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MISSILES AND MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

The state of the s

DECLASSIFIED

Authority MR 82-324 #5

8v *SKI* NLE Date *8123/85* 

PORTIONS EXEMPTED E.O. 12356, SEC. 13 (Q(1)(2)(5) NSC letter 6/26/85

NIF DATE 8/23/85

### TOP SECRET

NSC 6021

TOP SECRET

December 14, 1960

NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY to the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL on

MISSILES AND MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS

References: NSC Actions Nos. 1433, 1484, 1615-c, 1653, 1690, 1733, 1765, 1800, 1846, 1956, NOTE following 2013, 2081, 2118, 2168, 2207, 2208, 2238-b-(9), 2300-g, and 2315

The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council.

The enclosure, prepared by the NSC Staff at the request of the NSC Planning Board, is a codification of current policy derived from the reference actions by the National Security Council, as approved by the President, 1955 to 1960. If adopted and approved, the enclosure is intended to supersede the reference NSC Actions.

It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed statement of policy, it be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by the Secretary of Defense and, as appropriate, the Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

MARION W. BOGGS Deputy Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence



NSC 6021

TOP SECRET

egy yezh e<del>le</del>kkezeke.

TOP SECRET

#### DRAFT

# STATEMENT OF POLICY on MISSILES AND MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS\*

- Urgency of ICBM Development (NSC Action No. 1433, approved September 13, 1955)
- a. There would be the gravest repercussions on the national security and on the cohesion of the Free World, should the USSR achieve an operational capability with the ICBM substantially in advance of the United States.
- b. In view of known Soviet progress in this field, the development by the United States of an operational capability with the ICEM is a matter of great urgency.
- c. The Secretary of Defense will prosecute the program with maximum urgency, and all other Executive departments and agencies will assist the Department of Defense as required. The Secretary of Defense will report promptly to the National Security Council any significant developments or causes of delay in this program (including avenues not explored), and additionally will give the Council a special briefing at least once a year, normally in December, on the status of progress and major problems involved, including a statement of what could be done in the direction of setting an earlier target date for operational capability and the arguments for and against such a proposal.



NSC 6021


- 1 -

TOP SECRET


TOP SECRET

## 2. Urgency of IRBM Development (NSC Action No. 1484, approved December 20, 1955)

- <u>a.</u> The President stated that the political and psychological impact upon the world of the early development of an effective ballistic missile with a range in the 1000-1700 mile range would be so great that early development of such a missile would be of critical importance to the national security of the United States.
- <u>b.</u> Mutual interference between the IRBM and ICBM programs should be avoided so far as practicable, but if a conflict should occur in which strict application of paragraph <u>a</u> above would, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, cause major damage to the security interests of the United States, then the matter will be promptly referred to the President.



\_TOP-SPERET



4. Priority List
(NSC Actions No. 2081, approved May 13, 1959; No. 2118, approved August 21, 1959; No. 2208, approved April 1, 1960)

The President has established the following programs as having the highest priority above all others for research and development and for achieving operational capability; scope of the operational capability to be approved by the President:

(Order of listing does not indicate priority of one program over another)

- (1) ATLAS (ICBM) Weapon System
- (2) TITAN (ICBM) Weapon System
- (3) POLARIS (FBM) Weapon System
- (4) MINUTEMAN (ICBM) Weapon System
- (5) Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS)
  Phase I, including Project DEW DROP
- (6) NIKE-ZEUS Weapon System (research and development only)
- (7) Space programs determined by the President on advice of the National Aeronautics and Space Council to have objectives having key political, scientific, psychological or military import.



TOP SECRET

The President has designated the following projects under the category specified in (7) above:

DISCOVERER (satellite guidance and recovery)
MERCURY (manned satellite)
SATURN (1,500,000 pound-thrust, clustered rocket engine)\*

- Scope of Operational Capability of Missiles
   (NSC Actions No. 2168, approved January 13, 1960; No. 2207, approved April 6, 1960; No. 2315, approved October 5, 1960)
- a. The presently-approved ICBM program is 27 squadrons (13 ATLAS and 14 TITAN).
- <u>b</u>. The approved initial operational force objective for MINUTEMAN specifies the achievement of 150 operational missiles by mid-calendar year 1963.
- c. A total of 14 POLARIS submarines is authorized for construction.
- d. Long lead time planning and procurement actions are authorized to permit construction of 5 additional POLARIS submarines.
- 6. Satellite Destruction (NSC Action No. 2300-g, approved September 21, 1960)

Any test which involves destroying a satellite or space vehicle shall not proceed without specific Presidential approval.

TOP CHORDE

<sup>\*</sup> SATURN added at meeting of National Aeronautics and Space Council of January 12, 1960; minutes approved by the President on January 26, 1960.