View Cross-domain Competition: How Organizational Stovepipes Create Risks for Shared Missions By Morgan Dwyer PublishedOctober 29, 2020 Today, traditional nuclear missions increasingly intersect with emerging technical domains such as space and cyber. How can policymakers mitigate the risks that bureaucratic competition can pose to the shared mission of defending the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system?
View A Balance of Instability: Effects of a Direct-ascent Anti-satellite Weapons Ban on Nuclear Stability By Kaitlyn Johnson PublishedOctober 26, 2020 How would new norms for testing space weapons affect nuclear stability and traditional deterrence? Would a direct-ascent ASAT limit or ban create stability or further destabilize the space and nuclear domains?
View The Air Force Digital Century Series: Beyond the Buzzwords By Morgan Dwyer PublishedNovember 18, 2019 in terms of a “holy trinity” of agile development, open architecture, and digital engineering. But as was discussed at the Air Force Association’s 2019 National Convention, the Digital Century Series is more than just a series of buzzwords. My understanding of the USAF’s plan to implement and integrate these buzzwords—as well as that plan’s potential—are […]
View How the Air Force Can Save $30 Billion By Todd Harrison PublishedNovember 11, 2019 This analysis examines possible fleet reductions that could generate $30 billion in savings over the next five years for the US Air Force.
View The Air Force of the Future By Todd Harrison PublishedOctober 29, 2019 The Air Force of the Future reviews the three congressionally mandated studies of the Air Force’s current and future force structure.
View What Can 24 Satellites Do for U.S. Missile Defense? By Thomas G. Roberts PublishedOctober 18, 2018 Despite some missile defense advocates’ claims that 24 satellites could form the basis of a boost-phase space-based missile interceptor (SBI) system, many physicists do not agree. A better question is how could a satellite constellation of this size best contribute to U.S. missile defense?
View U.S. Missile Defense and the Theater-Strategic Nexus By Ryan Fedasiuk PublishedOctober 17, 2018 As it stands, the planned strategy of forsaking arms control in the name of coercive diplomacy is bound to backfire. The Pentagon should tread carefully, lest it invites Russia to develop strategic weapons it has no method or intention of countering.
View Unmanned Aerial Systems’ Influences on Conflict Escalation Dynamics By John Schaus, Kaitlyn Johnson PublishedAugust 7, 2018 This CSIS analysis details how escalation and deterrence dynamics change with the increasing use of UAS in conflict areas and examines several cases of how these dynamics might realistically occur.
View Why a Space-Based Missile Interceptor System Is Not Viable By Thomas G. Roberts PublishedJuly 2, 2018 The deployment of a space-based missile intercept layer would require launching hundreds or thousands of weapons into space – an expensive, inefficient, and provocative proposition.
View Improving Disaster Response through Aerospace Technology By Kyle Libby PublishedMarch 22, 2018 In these circumstances, the aerospace field offers tremendous capabilities for effective disaster response. By analyzing the capabilities offered by these aerospace technologies, it becomes clear that increased funding and development would prove a boon to effective disaster response and recovery.
